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PREAMBLE 
I am privileged to have the opportunity to speak to this august audience of 
distinguished development economists very briefly, on what I have called the ‘Triad 
of Governance, Devolution and National Prosperity’. This, triad, I believe, lies at the 
heart of what constitutes the theme of this conference, namely ‘Institutional Change, 
Growth and Poverty’. 
The National Reconstruction Bureau which I was privileged to create and lead 
for all the three years of General Musharraf’s tenure as Chief Executive of Pakistan, 
was meant to transtate into reality the vision we crystallised for addressing the 
persistent failure of the institutions of state to provide solutions to the ever growing 
political, administrative, financial, judicial and social problems that the people of 
Pakistan faced since independence. The vision was ‘Reconstruction of the 
Institutions of State for Establishing Genuine and Sustainable Democracy to ensure 
Durable Good Governance for an Irreversible Transfer of Power to the People of 
Pakistan as soon as possible’. 
I will first give you a fleeting birds eye view of the wide spectrum over which 
our National Reconstruction endeavour in pursuit of this vision was spread. In the 
second part of this talk, which will contain the core of what I want to put across 
today, I will talk about financial devolution of the state. The third part of my talk will 
deal briefly with the burning issue of what we should do for turning our common 
citizens’ poverty into prosperity. 
 
POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVOLUTION 
In the first part of my talk let me take you back four years to when General 
Parvez Musharraf assumed control, and on 14th October 1999 gave out the structure 
of his government which was to be headed by a National Security Council that was 
to have a think tank to assist it. I was asked by General Musharraf to head this think 
tank and I made two proposals to him. The first was that the think tank be named the 
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National Reconstruction Bureau. And second that, since Pakistan had come to the 
sorry pass at which it then stood principally because of the failure of the political, 
administrative, financial and judicial institutions of state to provide good governance 
to the people, we should focus on the reconstruction of the institutions of state to 
establish a genuine and sustainable democracy which could deliver good governance 
to the people of Pakistan on a durable basis, and thus close the doors to military 
interventions permanently. It was a vision to replace the colonial governance 
structures and systems prevailing in the country from bottom to top so as to enable 
the citizens, the nation and the State to prosper and flourish in the emerging 
environment of the 21st Century. 
Consequently, on 16th November 1999, the NSC, headed by General Parvez 
Musharraf, approved the name of the think tank, its mission of ‘Formulating, 
National Policy and Strategy Options for Approval by the NSC’. And in pursuit of 
the Chief Executive’s 7-Point Agenda, the NSC also approved nine ‘Fields of Focus’ 
proposed by me, to orient the NRB’s effort. A strategic plan to begin the effort in the 
first phase, with establishing a new empowered Local Government System across all 
the nine fields of focus, and to deal with devolution from the Federal to the 
Provincial level in the second phase preparatory to elections in the third phase was 
also approved. 
You are aware that to replace the previous ineffective system of Local Bodies, 
a new Local Government System based on politically, administratively and 
financially empowered Local Governments was established between December 2000 
and August 2001, and by Allah’s grace, it is functioning. This was done by 
eliminating the colonial structure and system of rulership of the people directly by 
the bureaucracy led by commissioners at the division, district and sub-division 
levels. With the Executive Magistracy eliminated, criminal justice was transferred 
entirely to Judicial Magistrates, and the judicial arm of the state thus stood separated 
from the executive arm. The colonial Police Act 1861 was replaced by a new police 
law in August 2002, to transform the police from a purely coercive arm of the state 
into a people-friendly instrument controlled by the people, for providing policing 
service to the citizens as well as the state, to protect both against unlawful conduct. 
All this was supported by decentralisation of the judicial authority of habeas corpus 
from the High Courts to the District and Sessions Courts, and the establishment of 
Small Claims and Minor Offences Courts. 
The second set of efforts of the NRB which bore fruit were at the very top— 
the political system. First, a new Political Parties Act, to replace the outmoded and 
heavily mutilated 1962 Act, was promulgated. This requires the political parties to 
practice internal democracy and federalism in order to qualify for the award of an 
election symbol for contesting an election. And second, the Legal Framework Order, 
which contained amendments to the Constitution in three areas, viz., Democratic 
Framework, Federalism, and Check and Balance measures, was promulgated prior to 
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the elections. This document was finally passed by the Parliament as a constitutional 
amendment, with minor changes, in December 2003. 
A large number of changes in the Constitution that were considered necessary 
for further strengthening democracy, federalism and governance did not finally get 
included in the LFO. However, that now is history. But if Pakistan is to realise its 
full potential it must develop the intrinsic strength of its people, which is possible 
only if the people are politically empowered through a genuine and sustainable 
federal democracy down to the grassroots, and a just and efficient, people-centred, 
rights and responsibility based, service delivery oriented, governance system, 
focused on administrative and financial decentralisation, firmly supported by a 
system of justice that commands the confidence of the people, by keeping both 
democracy and administration on the path of justice. The NRB had therefore made 
comprehensive reconstruction plans across the entire spectrum of governance.  But 
the Government ran out of time, and therefore had to leave all those National 
Reconstruction plans for the democratic government to take up for adoption and 
implementation. 
Fifteen months having been consumed in the firm establishment of this 
government, the stage now appears set for taking up all those and other measures, so 
that democracy does not derail and governance does not fail the people. I will say a 
few words on all these measures merely to set the stage for the main part of my talk. 
Starting with the top politico-administrative structures of the state, it is my 
conviction that in our socio-cultural milieu, characterised as it is by a feudal 
mindset, a feudal outlook, and a feudal approach to life as a whole, the 
parliamentary system is just a means for the institutionalisation of the feudal social 
order. Our political future lies in a federal presidential system of government led 
by a directly elected President, with a highly empowered Parliament, to exercise 
financial and administrative control over the executive branch headed by the 
President, and the judicial branch of government headed by the Chief Justice of 
Pakistan, so that the President does not become an autocrat, and the judiciary does 
not become a pawn in the hands of the President. This will ensure that the prime 
time and prime energy of the executive, headed by the President, is spent in 
governance, and not in perpetual politicking for political survival, as has been the 
case with our Prime Ministers. 
The second structural change that is imperative for sustenance of democracy 
as well as good governance is the creation of administratively governable provinces 
to replace the existing geographically or demographically country-size provinces. 
The sooner we overcome our reservations about this measure the better. Some 
number between 10 to 15 provinces each with 7 to 10 districts would allow the 
country to be governed much more efficiently as well as reduce provincialism. 
Federalism is the other measure that will enhance inter-provincial harmony, 
national unity and good governance. Raising the institutional esteem of the Senate by 
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making its members directly elected, and giving the Senate a major role in the 
continuance and removal of a state of emergency under the draconian colonial 
articles of the Constitution related to emergency, are essential measures. To go along 
with a federal-presidential system, however, the Senate must be a directly elected 
upper House. Almost equally important is legislative, and therefore administrative 
autonomy to the Provinces through a revision of the Federal and Concurrent 
Legislative Lists; and strengthening of the Council of Common Interests for giving 
the Provinces a substantive role in the formulation of policy and exercise of control 
over the vast array of institutions and facilities that were provincial in character 
before 1971.  All these measures will require constitutional amendments and will 
therefore have to be handled and timed very deftly. 
But devolution of political power to the provincial and local levels is not 
enough. Without decentralisation of administrative authority, the scope of exercise of 
political power gets restricted, and governance remains with the top bureaucracy. In 
this field it is imperative that five major institutional reconstruction initiatives be 
pursued with commitment and vigour. These are:  
 (a) First the decentralisation of authority over human, financial and material 
resources within the Federal Government from the federal secretaries to the 
heads of the attached departments who wield the responsibility for 
executing government plans. The federal secretariats must have regulatory 
authority. 
 (b) Second, at the Provincial level, apart from this objective, the provincial 
structures and systems need to be re-designed to function coherently in the 
new environment of devolution of political power and decentralisation of 
administrative authority to the local levels.  
 (c) The third imperative measure is the total reconstruction of all the federal 
and provincial civil services of the country to harmonise their functioning 
with the new governance system; to ensure that they are served by men 
and women who deserve the status of the èlite on the basis of their stature 
as the èlite; and to ensure that the system of selection, training and career 
progression draws on the best from the whole lot to rise to the top 
positions.  
 (d) The fourth administrative system that needs reconstruction is the Public 
Employment System. The new system of public employment must be based 
on selecting at least 50 percent people on merit, and applying the quota to 
just 50 percent; and over a decade, this 50 percent must gradually drop to 
zero. Coupled with this, the quota must apply to the under-privileged 
sections of the society, and not be a provincial quota.  
 (e) And the fifth system that needs a fundamental reconstruction is the Public 
Information System. It is time we based a Public Information System not 
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on what should be known to the public, but on what may be necessary to 
conceal from the public for the sake of national security alone.  
 (f) The NRB’s plans on most of these were left in August-September 2002 for 
the new government to take up. 
What I have spoken of so far is devolution of political power and 
decentralisation of administrative authority both within each order of government, as 
well as from a higher order of government to a lower order of government. These 
measures are not meant to serve some altruistic purpose or serve a theoretical need. 
They are almost directly related to creating an environment of liberty for the 
common people, for the government functionaries and for the political leadership, 
within which to set goals, objectives and targets to adders the people’s needs. And so 
long as this liberty is exercised in a legal and just environment, it is bound to lead to 
the prosperity of the citizens individually, the nation collectively and the state as a 
guardian of both. 
 
FINANCIAL DEVOLUTION 
This sets the stage for the second part of this talk, which relates to financial 
devolution and decentralisation. Among democracies the world over, Pakistan is by 
far the most financially centralised state in the world. This is a distinction that needs 
to be gotten rid of as soon as possible if we wish not only utilise to our available 
financial resources to better effect, but even for raising our financial resources, both 
as common citizens and as a state.  
Our existing system of managing the economy has failed us over the first half 
century of our national existence, because it has resulted in the ballooning of the 
external and internal debt of the country and yet failed to check the growth of 
poverty. While no system can under-write the economic health of the nation and the 
state if placed in the hands of self-serving profligate leaders, it is probably equally 
true that a system based on checks and balance would certainly make it difficult for 
such leaders to hold unbridled sway over the economy.  
The existing structures and systems suffer from two fundamental flaws. First, 
they are too centralised and are therefore not responsive to the imperative of 
spending money in accordance with the needs of the people as perceived by the three 
orders of government—the federal, the provincial and the local. The second major 
flaw is that the governmental structures that manage the national economy do so in 
an environment of conflicts of interests. Together, these flaws take away the 
incentive for optimising the raising of revenue, and simultaneously undermine fiscal 
responsibility down the line.  
What follow are some of the recommendations arrived at in the National 
Reconstruction Bureau over the three years of General Musharraf’s rule as Chief 
Executive of Pakistan, on the subject of Reconstruction of the Economic Structures 
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and Systems, meant to address these flaws. The NRB made these proposals to the 
government in 2002 but did not succeed in having them adopted. Their acceptance 
and adoption however, is critically important for the survival of the nation and the 
state. In this context I will speak briefly on the following four issues: 
 (a) Economic Management, 
 (b) Monetary Management, 
 (c) Financial Management, and 
 (d) Expenditure Management. 
Economic Management  
 (a) National Economic Council. The structure at the apex of the economic 
management pyramid should be the National Economic Council, but 
with a much leaner and clearer mandate than spelt out in the 1973 
Constitution. The NEC must be an inter-governmental executive body 
(and not, as the Constitution says, a recommendatory body) for deciding 
on the economic, social, financial and commercial policy for the nation 
(and not for making plans, as the Constitution says). Secondly, it must 
decide all policy issues related to debt management. Thirdly it should 
advise all governments on economic matters. And finally since economic 
management is a continuous process the NEC must meet at least four 
times a year, and its decisions should serve as directives for all 
ministries, the State Bank and the Provinces. When the NEC is not in 
session, the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council 
(ECNEC), led by the Chairman Planning Commission, and composed of 
the ministers for Finance, Commerce, Industries and Privatisation, and 
the Governor State Bank, should be responsible to the NEC for taking 
decisions on economic management issues, presented before it by the 
Planning Commission. 
 (b) Planning Commission. Led by a full-fledged Minister as Chairman, the 
Planning Commission should be recognised and organised as a think tank 
for the National Economic Council, as well as serve as its secretariat. Its 
functions should include formulation of draft economic, social, financial 
and commercial policies for approval by the NEC. The Commission must 
also manage adherence to the approved policy by all concerned. And 
thirdly, the Commission must be responsible to the NEC for all aspects of 
debt management. The Commission must not be involved in making 
development plans; it could therefore be re-named the Economic 
Commission instead of the Planning Commission. 
 (c) Planning Division. The Planning Division is a hold over from the era of 
central planning in the Soviet mould. It must therefore, at the very least, 
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not encumber what I have suggested be called the Economic Commission. 
Instead it may be a separate ministry tasked exclusively to develop a 
planning policy based on the ruling party’s manifesto, which may serve as 
a guideline for the federal divisions to develop their respective 
development plans and projects. Secondly, it should oversee and 
coordinate the efforts of the federal ministries towards the faithful 
implementation of those projects on behalf of the Prime Minister. The 
development plans should be limited to projects funded out of the federal 
budget. In the true spirit of federalism, the provinces must enjoy full 
financial autonomy over their respective provincial revenues, irrespective 
of the original source of the revenue. This implies that the ECNEC and 
CDWP must cease to accord approval to provincial projects. Whether 
these bodies should even approve federal projects needs to be re-examined. 
 
Monetary Management 
The State Bank exclusively should be responsible to the NEC for 
monetary management, and should be mandated to ensure money supply exactly 
in accordance with the inflation rate and growth rate decided by the National 
Economic Council. If increase in money supply is considered necessary, it is the 
NEC alone that should decide to raise the inflation rate or accept a reduction in 
the growth rate, based on the recommendations of the Planning Commission. The 
existing Monetary and Fiscal Coordination Board, which allows the Ministry of 
Finance to manage the economy through monetary expansion beyond the 
inflation rate decided by the NEC, in the face of inadequate revenue collection, 
should cease to exist. Instead the ECNEC should make the appropriate 
recommendation to the NEC and seek its approval. This would take care of the 
conflict of interest inherent in the Monetary and Fiscal Coordination Board. 
 
Financial Management  
 (a) The system of economic management outlined above would streamline the 
functions of the Finance Ministry. The Finance Division will then be able 
to focus on its wide-ranging core functions of budgeting, collection of 
revenue, distribution and provision of financial resources to the federal 
ministries and the provinces, accounting of all federal expenditure, 
overseeing expenditure management of all federal ministries and 
departments, and control over government owned financial institutions. 
 (b) A critically important component of financial management is the subject 
of National Finance Award for the sharing of state revenue by the three 
orders of governments, the federal, the provincial and the local. After a 
year of intensive work the NRB developed a set of alternate proposals, 
each of which could serve as a basis for the 6th National Finance Award.  
Syed Tanwir Husain Naqvi 
 
 
 
636
 (c) The most far-reaching one out of these proposals was presented by the 
NRB in June 2002 before the President of Pakistan, the Governors and the 
Ministry of Finance. But a decision on it was pended because the Ministry 
of Finance prevailed upon the President to leave this issue for the next 
government to handle. However, since this proposal involved amendments 
in the Constitution to reduce its rigidity on the issues of devolution of taxes 
to the provinces and the composition and functions of the National Finance 
Commission, we lost the ideal opportunity for it in 2002.  
 (d) The essence of this proposal was as follows: 
 (1) The Federal Government would retain one major tax i.e. Income and 
Corporate Tax, and two minor taxes i.e. Federal Excise excluding Gas, 
Tobacco and Tobacco Manufacture, thus increasing the Federal 
Government’s own source revenue by 122 percent. 
 (2) The Provinces would get all other taxes presently assigned to the 
Federal Government or the Divisible Pool of Taxes, thus raising their 
own source revenue by 126 percent. In the process, the Provinces 
would be able to meet almost 40 percent of their total expenditure even 
at the existing poor levels of collection, instead of just 17 percent.  
 (3) In addition the Provinces would get 1/6th of the GST (2.5 percent out 
of the 15 percent) for straight transfers to the Local Governments. 
 (4) The Local Government would get two taxes: while the Tehsil/Town 
governments will get 2.5 percent (out of the 15 percent) GST, the 
Urban Immovable Property Tax would go to the District Governments 
after collection by the Provinces. 
 (5) Only one major and one minor tax would form part of the Divisible 
Pool viz. the General Sales Tax (12.5 percent out of 15 percent), and 
the Custom Duty. This Divisible Pool, divided equally viz. 50 percent 
to the Federal Government and 50 percent to the four Provincial 
Governments, would enable the Federal Government to meet 64.5 
percent of its expenditure, as opposed to 62 percent at present, from 
own sources and its share in the Divisible Pool. The Provinces would, 
however, be able to meet 92 percent of their expenditure compared 
with 80 percent now. 
 (6) The Federal Government has the facility to meet the balance of its 
expenditure through loans, aid etc. the Provinces could be helped to 
reduce their deficit by another 5.5 percent if the Federal Government 
writes-off their loans on the lines of IMF helping out the Federal 
Government. They could manage the remaining 2.5 percent deficit 
through better expenditure management. 
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 (7) The NRB worked equally rigorously on the horizontal distribution of 
the provincial share of the Divisible Pool, and came to the conclusion 
that this could be fairly equitably done on the basis of a formula driven 
by four factors viz. Population – 65 percent, Fiscal Effort – 15 percent, 
Human Development –15 percent, and Area – 5 percent, or with some 
reasonable variations in these percentages, yet ensuring that all four 
factors remained intact. 
 (8) This proposal is first of all a lot simpler than the existing Award. But 
more importantly, this proposal gives to all orders of government a 
stake in widening the tax base of all the taxes allocated to them, as well 
the taxes in the Divisible Pool, and thus cause the raising of  the 
national revenue, and indeed through its use, the GNP itself.  The next 
issue is expenditure management. 
 
Expenditure Management 
 (a) The most serious area of concern here is that, in violation of the 
constitution, the Auditor General of Pakistan continues to be the head of 
both the accounting and the auditing functions of the state. And the conflict 
of interest inherent to this structure is compounded by the fact that the 
accounts and the audit personnel of the government of Pakistan continue to 
belong to a single service headed by the Auditor General of Pakistan.  This 
conflict of interest has been partly addressed by the Controller General of 
Accounts Ordinance promulgated by the ministry of Finance in 2001-2002. 
Much, however still needs to be done, particularly the separation of the 
audit service from the accounts service at the federal level. 
 (b) The second area of concern here is the issue of accounting. There is a dire 
need to accept the fundamental fact that the agency that spends money must 
also maintain its accounts. Obvious as it sounds, the Federal Government is 
at least hip deep, if not neck deep, into accounting of provincial money, 
because the Accounts Service of the Federal Government does not want to 
pull out of the District Accounts Office structure and consequently reduce 
its numbers as well as its clout at that level. Fortunately the NRB was able 
to get all governments to agree two years ago to hand over all provincial 
accounting to the provinces by the year 2006. But apparently there is no 
movement by the Provincial Governments towards building the capacity of 
their accounting services to do so. 
 (c) The third area of concern is that most, if not all Local Governments were 
on a single entry system of accounting. With devolution, the need to build 
accounting capacity through crash courses became imperative two years 
ago. The provincial governments do not appear to be focussed on this 
critically important issue either. 
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 (d) The fourth issue concerning expenditure management relates to the 
Financial Advisor System. This system purports to prevent bad 
expenditure management but ends up creating the very opposite results, 
largely because the FA and his subordinates wield authority over 
expenditure without any responsibility for good financial management 
as a whole. Briefly what is necessary is that the Financial Advisors must 
turn into Finance Directors with Financial Analysts below them, and 
should be answerable to the head of the Department or Division they 
serve with. The Finance Secretary or the Controller General of 
Accounts should also report on them as countersigning officers. Project 
delays and cost over-runs are thus likely to remain within limits, and 
demoralisation of the dynamic officers of the government will be 
substantially reduced. 
 (e) There is also a strong case for establishing internal audit organisations 
within each department of the federal, provincial and local governments, to 
serve as eyes and ears of the executive and check fraud before it grows and 
gets out of hand at each level of government. 
This ends the second part of my discourse this morning, which concerned the 
management of the economy to harness the available financial resources to better 
effect.  
 
NATIONAL PROSPERITY 
The last part of my talk relates to creation of individual and national capital, 
thus eradicating poverty and taking the proven road to national prosperity. The road 
from national poverty to national prosperity is what Hernando De Soto, a Peruvian 
gentleman, shows the world in his classic book called “The Mystery of Capital”. 
Hernando De Soto heads what The Economist regarded as the second most important 
think tank of the world, called the Institute of Liberty and Democracy he established 
in Lima, Peru. As Personal Representative and Principal Advisor to the President of 
Peru, De Soto initiated Peru’s economic and political reforms, and was later named 
by the Time magazine as one of the five leading Latin American innovators of the 
20th century. 
The ‘Mystery of Capital’ revolutionises our understanding of what capital is, 
where it comes from, and why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails everywhere 
else. De Soto argues that foreign investment is, of course, a very good thing; the 
more of it the better. Stable currencies are good too, as are free trade and transparent 
banking practices, and the privatisation of state-owned industries and every other 
Western economic medicine dispensed by the IMF. Yet we continually forget that 
global capitalism has been tried before. These macro-economic and structural 
adjustment reforms, asserts De Soto, fall so far short as to be almost irrelevant. 
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De Soto demonstrates that the major stumbling block that keeps the poor 
nations from benefiting from capitalism is their inability to produce capital. He 
interprets Adam Smith, the father of modern economics, to define capital as the 
‘potential an accumulated stock holds to deploy new production’, and the ‘force that 
raises the productivity of labour’ and creates the wealth of nations. His research 
shows that most of the poor already possess the assets they need to make a success of 
capitalism. But they hold these assets in defective forms: houses built on land whose 
ownership rights are not adequately recorded, unincorporated businesses with 
undefined liability, and industries located where financiers and investors cannot see 
them. Because the rights to these are not adequately documented, these assets cannot 
readily be turned into capital, cannot be traded outside narrow local circles where 
people know and trust each other, cannot be used as collateral for a loan, and cannot 
be used as a share against investment. In other words these massive assets of the 
poor being illegal are not fungible. 
By De Soto’s calculations, the total assets in terms of real estate held, but not 
legally owned, by the poor of the Second and Third Worlds is at least $ 9.3 trillion. 
What does this $ 9.3 trillion mean? De Soto explains this with three equivalents.  
 (a) First, that if the US were to raise its foreign aid budget to the level 
recommended by the United Nations, viz. 0.7 percent of its national 
income, it would take this richest country on earth more than 150 years to 
transfer this amount to the world’s poor.  
 (b) Second, he says this $ 9.3 trillion is 93 times as much as all the 
development assistance from all advanced countries to the Third World in 
the last three decades of the 20th century (i.e. $ 100 billion).  
 (c) The third equivalent is that $ 9.3 trillion is the total value of all the 
companies listed on the main stock exchanges of the world’s most 
developed countries. 
This probably explains why the Bretton Woods institutions have not 
succeeded in turning even one Second or Third World country’s poverty into 
prosperity ever since these institutions were created. 
De Soto’s answer to the problem of capital creation at the individual level lies 
not in trying to force the masses of people owning illegal assets to somehow join the 
existing legal system; because, he says the existing legal systems are protected by 
and for the privileged sections of the society. On the contrary, the answer lies in 
integrating the formal legal system on which the overt economy is based, and the 
informal legal system on which the underground economy is based, and thus lend 
formal legality to the assets of all the people who own these resources. To undertake 
such a project De Soto has synthesised his dynamics into a formula which he calls 
the ‘Capitalisation Process’ with which he assists various governments throughout 
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the World. His book gives this formula in outline on two full pages, comprising four 
strategies viz. the Discovery Strategy, the Political and Legal Strategy, the 
Operational Strategy and the Commercial Strategy. 
The President of Pakistan, General Parvez Musharraf has very graciously 
accepted my proposal last November to invite Mr Hernando De Soto to Pakistan to 
hear him out; and then to decide what, if anything was needed to do on this critically 
important subject of national prosperity.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The essence of this thesis on ‘The Triad of Governance, Devolution and 
National Prosperity’ can be encapsulated in four conclusions: 
 (a) First, that the transition to a federal presidential system of government with 
a powerful bicameral legislature spearheaded by a strong Senate, and the 
division of the existing four into 10 to 15 politically, administratively and 
financially autonomous provinces, are fundamental structural changes 
necessary for establishing the foundation on which the edifice of national 
prosperity can be erected. 
 (b) Second, that good governance flowing as a consequence of devolution of 
political power, decentralisation of administrative and financial authority, 
and deconcentration of management functions, are prerequisites for 
unleashing and orienting the enthusiasm and creativity of our people 
towards meaningful progress. 
 (c) Third, that the reconstruction of the economic structures and systems at the 
federal and provincial levels, will help the governments optimise the 
production and utilisation of the available financial resources. 
 (d) And fourth, that taking De Soto’s route to individual prosperity through 
capital formation at the grassroots, promises to lead to the eradication of 
citizen poverty and its substitution by national prosperity. 
I have a deep conviction that in the emerging environment of peace and 
cooperation in the subcontinent, coupled with the new governance system providing 
us the politico-administrative infrastructure to tackle poverty at the grassroots, and 
all in the backdrop of our recent achievements in the macro-economic field, we need 
to take the bull (of poverty) by the horns, by going De Soto’s way; and over the next 
decade or so, consign poverty in Pakistan to the oblivion of history. This ushering in 
of an era of sustained national prosperity, will get Pakistan in step with the emerging 
environment of the 21st century, help the country exit the Third World for good, and 
propel it on the course to realising the full power potential of its dynamic people.  
 
